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Abstract-To every pair p. 4 of distinct primes there correspond 9 positive integers x no larger than p9 
such that 
xc = x mod (~9) 
for every odd positive integer c. Therefore these 9 messages x are unconcealable in any Rivest-Shamir- 
Adleman public key cryptosystem which has the product p9 for its encoding modulus. There are, in fact, 
such cryptosystems which do not conceal any messages, and others which conceal less than 50% of all 
messages possible within them. These examples point up the need for effective criteria for evaluating the 
concealing power of any such cryptosystem. This paper treats these questions for a general square free 
encoding modulus m. It contains easy to use necessary and sufficient conditions that the function f(x) = xc 
be: 
I. a permutation of the residue classes modulo m ; 
2. a derangement (i.e. a permutation without fixed points) of the collection of all the residue classes 
modulo m other than the unavoidably unconcealable ones. 
It also provides a construction of all such “deranging” exponents. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Until a few years ago codes and ciphers in common use suffered from a serious drawback. If you 
gave somebody a key which allowed him to use a piece of cryptographic equipment to encode a 
message you also, by that very act, gave him the wherewithal to decode (i.e. take the transmitted 
ciphertext message and recover the original clear-text message which gave rise to it) every message 
which has been encoded on that equipment with that key. 
Diffe and Hellman recently pointed out that this need not always be the case. In fact an English 
to Spanish dictionary (the encoding key) helps you to “encode” a message written in English by 
translating it into Spanish, but does not help you to “decode” the message by translating the 
Spanish text back to English. For that you need a Spanish to English dictionary (the separate 
decoding key). 
Suppose there is a way to produce a cleartextish to ciphertextish dictionary with so many 
entries and so seemingly confusing a structure that nobody but you (who know the method behind 
the ostensible madness of its construction) can sort it so as to produce a ciphertextish to 
cleartextish dictionary. Then you can give copies of the former dictionary (the public encoding 
key) to everybody in the world and keep your one copy of the latter dictionary (your private 
decoding key). In this case you have established a public key cryptosystem enabling everybody to 
encode messages for sending to you. 
Rivest et al. [4] did this, and a bit more. It is routine to turn written, spoken, and even pictorial 
messages into lists of bit strings. So they defined a message to be a positive integer x smaller than 
10200. Both cleartext messages and ciphertext messages are of this form. They then asked any 
potential message receiver R to find two primes p and q larger than lOi@’ and two integers c and d 
between 3 and m = pq such that cd = 1 mod ((p - l)(q - 1)). They asked the receiver R to keep p, q 
and d secret, but to announce c and m to the world. Anybody wishing to form the encoded message 
y corresponding to a cleartext message x finds the smallest positive integer y such that 
y = xc mod (m). This is how the sender constructs the cleartextish to ciphertextish alf of the 
dictionary. When receiver R gets the message y he forms the smallest positive integer z such that 
z = yd mod (m). This is how the receiver constructs the ciphertextish to cleartextish alf of the 
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dictionary. It follows from a short argument based on Fermat’s theorem and the way c and d were 
chosen above that I = (x’)~ = x1 mod (m) and, consequently, that z = x. The idea is that it is hard to 
factor numbers as large as m but it is easy to find primes as big asp and q. So the fact that only the 
receiver R knows the factorization of m seems to entail that only the receiver R knows how to 
decode messages. 
The article[4] aforementioned has more background and shows how to give unforgeable 
signatures by telegraph or telex, an important feature not shared by many other cryptosystems, 
even many other public key cryptosystems. In this paper we will modify the procedure described 
above and in [4] to avoid a possibly unfortunate choice of coding exponent c. To see what can 
happen if the message receiver R does not take additional precautions consider the following 
example. 
Suppose that 
p=97 
q = 109 
m = 10573 
c = 865 
d = 9505. 
Then obviously 
m=97*109=pq _ 
&)=p-l=% 
r$(q) = q - 1 = 108 
4(m) = (p - I)(q - 1) = 96 * 108 = 10368 
cd = 8221825 =I+ 793 * 10368. 
Consequently 
cd = 1 mod ((p - l)(q - 1)). 
From all these facts it is immediate that there is a Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) public key 
cryptosystem [4] which has: 
10573 = m as its public encoding modulus; 
865 = c as its public encoding exponent; 
9505 = d as its private decoding exponent. 
But this cryptosystem provides no concealment. The encoded form of every single message is 
exactly the same as the cleartext. In other words 
X 865 = x mod (10573) 
for every integer x. This can be verified numerically. But it also follows readily from[l] or 
[3,1-80]. If we change only c and d above, so that 
c = 169 
d=3865 
cd=653185=1+63*10368 
then it is not hard to verify that there are 325 unconcealed messages out of 10573. This latter 
cryptosystem has a concealment rate between 96% and 97%, compared to 0% for the crypto- 
system which used 
c = 865 
for its coding exponent. 
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The foregoing statements are all easy to verify on the basis of the development below. But 
we ask the reader to accept them at face value for the moment. These examples were adduced, 
not as isolated peculiarities, but to motivate the threefold purpose of this paper, which is to 
provide: 
1. A proof that the Rivest-Shamir-Adleman sufficient condition on c and m that the 
function 
f(x) = xc 
effect a permutation of the residue classes modulo m is also a necessary condition; 
2. A uniform lower bound, independent of the public encoding modulus m and the public 
encoding exponent c, to the number of unconcealable messages in a Rivest-Shamir-Adleman 
number theoretic public key cryptosystem based on the encoding modulus m, i.e. a uniform 
lower bound on the number of residue classes modulo m which solve the congruence 
xc =x mod (m); 
3. A necessary and sufficient condition on c and m that the congruence 
xc =x mod (m) 
have no more than the number of solutions given by this aforementioned uniform lower bound, 
in other words that a Rivest-Shamir-Adleman key cryptosystem offer the maximum possible 
concealment. 
In fact, 2 and 3 both follow from Theorem 3, which provides a formula for the number of 
unconcealable messages in a number theoretic public key cryptosystem of a general kind, which 
includes RSA cryptosystems as a special case. We need a few variants of standard notation for 
typographical simplicity. If T is a finite set of positive integers we let IIT (LCM, GCDT) be 
the product (least common multiple, greatest common divisor) of the members of T. Thus, for 
example, 
I-I{x’~l IX 14}= II{1,4,9,16}=576 
LCM{9,12} = 36 
GCD(9,12, IS} = 3. 
As usual, void products are equal to 1. ; 
We follow the terminology in [3, pa l-801. In what follows, T will denote a set of k bdd primes, 
where k 2 2, and the modulus m will be of the form 
m = II(p”‘p’Jp E T} 
where the a(p) are positive integers. The modulus m is square free 12, p. 161 if n(p) = 1 for all 
p E T. 
As usual 4 is the Euler totient function [3, p. 27-311 and A is the universal exponent function 
([3], p. 53). Thus 
d’(m) = niti - l)p”@‘-‘lp E T} 
A(m) = LCM{(p - l)p”@‘-‘lp E T} 
since all the primes p are odd. For the modulus m used in the examples above 
m = II{plp E T} = 97* 109 = 10573 
4(m) = II{p - lip E T} = %* 108 = 10368 
h(m)=LCM{p-l(pET}=864. 
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Evidently we have 4(m) = 10368 = 12 * 864 = 12r\(m), in accordance with the observation[l] 
that A(m) is a factor of 4(m). 
In the development below we will consider the following natural generalization of RSA 
cryptosystem. 
Definition 1: A number theoretic public key cryptosystem is a list 
of three integers, where m is square free and 
2ScIm-1 
2=dsm-l 
cd = 1 mod (A(m)). 
Every public key cryptosystem of Rivest-Shamir-Adleman type[4] satisfies this definition. But 
the definition also covers other public key cryptosystems. 
2. PERMUTING RESIDUE CLASSES BY TAKING POWERS 
THEOREM 1. Let c z 2 be an integer. Let f(x) = xc. If m is not square free then f is not a 
permutation of the residue classes modulo m. If m is square free then f is a permutation of the 
residue classes module m if and only if c is relatively prime to A(m). 
Proof. If pz divides m then 
(m/p)’ = 0” mod (m) 
since c -> 2. But m/p+ 0 mod (m). This proves the first statement. Now let m be square free. 
The sufficiency of the condition 
GCD{c, A(m)} = 1 
. 
was proved for k = 2 in [4] and for k 2 2 in [ 11. Conversely suppose that 
u = GCD{c, A(m)} > 1. 
Let g belong [3, p. 431 to the exponent A(m) modulo m and let 
x(i) = gl+iMm)lu 
where i=O,l,..., u-l.Clearly 
x(i)’ = g’ mod (m) 
foralli=O,l,..., u - 1. On the other hand the congruence 
x(i) = x(j) mod (m) 
would imply 
whence 
iA(m)/u = jA(m)/u mod (A(m)), 
i = j mod (u). 
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Hence 
i = j. 
Thus there are u distinct elements mapped to the same element by f. This ends the proof. 
COROLLARY 1. Zf f(x) = xc is a permutation of the residue classes modulo m then m is square 
free and c is odd. 
3.UNCONCEALABLEMESSAGESARELJNAVOIDABLE 
THEOREM 2. Let c and m be positive integers. Let c be odd. Then there are at least 3k residue 
classes x modulo m such that 
xc =x mod (m). 
Proof. Recall that 
m = lI(p”@)lp E T}, 
where T has k members. Clearly 0,l and - 1 are solutions of the congruences 
xc = x mod (PO@)) 
for every p E T. The result follows by combining these solutions, using the Chinese Remainder 
Theorem [3, p. 351. 
In the RSA case m = pq, whence there are 9 messages which are unconcealable in any 
cryptosystem (c, d, m). These 9 do not depend on the choice of c or d. Let us illustrate this by 
augmenting an example due to Rivest et al. (141, p. 124) which has been augmented by Simmons and 
Norris [5,6]. Let 
p =47 
q = 59 
m = 2773. 
Then obviously 
m =47*59=pq 
(Q)=p-1=46 
4(q) = q - 1 = 58 
b(m) = (p - l)(q - 1) = 46 * 58 = 2668. 
If we note that 
2772= - 1+59*47=-1+47*59 
2537=-1+54*47=0+43*59 
2302=-1+49*47=1+39*59 
235=0+5*47=-1+4*59 
0=0+0*47 =0+0*59 
2538=0+54*47 = 1+43*59 
471=1+10*47 =-1+8*59 
236= 1+5*47=0+4*59 
1=1+0*47=1+0*59 
then we have found representatives of 9 residue classes modulo 2773 which are unconcealable 
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in any Rivest-Shamir-Adleman public key cryptosystem based on the encoding modulus 
m = 2773. Obviously if p and q are primes and U(pq) is the set of residue classes which are 
unconcealable in any Rivest-Shamir-Adleman public key cryptosystem based on the encoding 
modulus pq, then U(pq) contains the residue classes to which 0, 1 and pq - 1 belong. But 6 of 
the 9 members of U(pq) depend strongly on p and q. It is shown in111 that anybody who can 
find 1 of these latter 6 messages can thereby find p, and thus break the cryptosystem. 
We will now derive a formula for the number N of residue classes x modulo m such that 
xc =x mod (m). 
THEOREM 3.
N = II{(l + GCD{c - 1, d(p”@))))(p E T}. 
Proof. We prove the case k = 1 first. Thus we must show that the congruence 
has 1 t GCD{c - 1, &pa)} solution classes modulo pa. If, on the one hand, p is a factor of x 
and 
x’=xmod(p“) 
then 
but 
Therefore 
x(x-’ -1)sOrnod 
xc-’ f 1 mod(p). 
x=Omod(p”). 
If, on the other hand, p is not a factor of x then 
x = g: 
where g is a primitive rootp, p. 491 modulo p’. Thus 
g *’ = g’ mod (p”) 
if and only if 
t(c - 1) = 0 mod (~$(p”)). 
But this last congruence has GCD{c - 1, &pa)} solutions. From the case k = 1, the general 
theorem can be derived by means of the Chinese Remainder Theorem. 
COROLLARY 1. Let c be odd integer lager than 2. Then N = 3k if and only if 
GCDjc-l,A(m)}=Z. 
Proof. Since c - 1 is even and &“@‘) is even, then 
GCD(c - 1, (b@ “‘?} 2 2 
for every p E T. Therefore 
N 1 II{(l + 2)(p E T} = 3’. 
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GCD{c - 1, &p”‘“‘)} = 2 
for every p E T. Therefore 
GCD{c - 1, A(m)} = GCD{c - 1, LCM{&?‘)(p E TH 
= LCM{GCD{c - 1, &?‘@‘)}lp E T} 
= LCM(2lp E T} = 2. 
COROLLARY 2. Let m be square free. Let c be an odd integer greater than 2. If there is an 
integer x such that 
x’f x mod (m), 
then SN 5 3m. 
Proof. If A(m) were a factor of c - 1 then the congruence 
x’=xmod(m) 
would be an identity in x because m is square free. Therefore A(m) is not a factor of c - 1. So 
there is a prime q E T such that q - 1 is not a factor of c - 1. Hence 
2rGCD{q-1, c-l}=(q-1)/2, 
from which it follows that 
5 = q. 
Also 
If p E T\(q) then 
Therefore 
l+GCD{q-1, c-l}=(q+l)/2. 
N/m I: (1 + q)/2q 
= l/2+ 1/2q 
5 l/2 + l/10. 
It is clear from the proof that equality holds if and only if m is a square free multiple of 5, 
and c - 1 is a multiple of A(m/S). 
4. PERMUTING EXPONENTS, DERANGING EXPONENTS AND OPACITY. 
It is worthwhile to have a brief explicit way of verifying that a proposed encoding scheme 
actually effects a permutation of the messages. To recap our results along these lines we state a 
definition and a theorem. 
Definition 2. Let m be a square free odd positive integer. Let c be a positive integer. Then 
c is called a permuting exponent for m if every pair x, y of integers which satisfies the congruence 
xc = yc mod(m) 
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x = y mod(m). 
We have already proved that c is a permuting exponent for m if and only if c is relatively 
prime to A(m). 
As we have seen, the question of concealment is a complex one. An encoding exponent can 
effect a permutation of the residue classes module m, but no exponent can effect a derangement 
of these residue classes. At least 9 residue classes must be unchanged. More residue classes 
may be. There should, however, be a name and a criterion for encoding exponents which come 
as close as possible to effecting a derangement of the residue classes module m. Hence another 
definition and theorem. 
Definition 3. Let m be a square free odd positive integer. Let c be a permuting exponent for m. 
Then c is called a deranging exponent for m if every integer x which satisfies the congruence 
x’=xmod(m) 
also satisfies the congruence 
x3 =x mod (m). 
The foregoing discussion has proved that c is a deranging exponent for m if and only if 
GCD{c, A(m)} = 1 
GCD{c - 1, A(m)} = 2. 
The criterion above is not very stringent. In the RSA case we see that c is a deranging 
exponent for m if and only if 
GCD{c, (p - I)(q - 1)) = 1 
GCD{c - 1, LCM(p - 1, 4 - 1)) = 2. 
Note that h(m) can be replaced by 4(m) in the first equation, but not the second. 
THEOREM 4. Let m be square free. Then the number of deranging exponents c for m, which lie 
intherangeO<c<A(m),is 
(A(m)/f )H{l - 2/qlq is an odd prime factor of A(m)} 
where f = 4 if 4 is a factor of A(m), and f = 2 if 4 does not divide A(m). 
Comment. The proof below is a constructive one. It can be used to find the deranging 
exponents in question. 
Proof. Let W be the set of odd prime factors of A(m). We can write the prime factorization 
of A(m) as 
A(m) = 2”‘2’II{q”‘q’lq E W}. 
The first case to consider is o(2) = 1. Here we have GCD{c, A(m)} = 1 if and only if 
and 
GCD{c, 2) = 1 
GCD{c, q”‘q’} = 1 
for every q E T. This means that 
c+Omod(2) 
and that 
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for h E Y(q) = {1,2,. . . , q”‘q’-‘}. Also 
GCD{c - 1, A(m)} = 2 
if and only if 
GCD{c - 1, q”‘q’} = 1 
for every q E W or, equivalently 
c f 1 + hq mod (qucq)) 
for h E Y(q). Evidently the set 1 + Y(q) is disjoint from Y(q). The number of residue classes 
modulo qvcq) which do not belong to 
Y(q) u (1 + Y(q)) 
is q v(q) _ 2qvwl, which is positive since q L 3 for every q E W. Using the Chinese Remainder 
Theorem we can now construct all the deranging exponents for m. There are 
1 * n{q”‘4’ _ 2quw 14 E WI = (A(mKw{l - 2/qlq E WI 
of them. In the second case 2 I u(2). This time the simultaneous equalities 
GCD{c, A(m)} = 1 
GCD{c-l,h(m)}=2 
are equivalent o the statements 
GCD{ c, 2”“‘) = 1 (1) 
GCD{ c - 1, 2”‘2’} =2 (2) 
GCD{c, q”“)} = 1 (3) 
GCD{c - 1, q”‘q’} = 1 (4) 
for every q E W. Conditions (3) and (4) are treated exactly as in the first case above, and again 
provide 
4 u(q) _ 2q”‘q’-l 
residue classes modulo qvcq) to which c can belong. Conditions (1) and (2) are equivalent to the 
congruence 
c * 3 mod (4), 
which provides 2”(2)-2 residue classes modulo 2”(2) to which c can belong. Here, too, the Chinese 
Remainder Theorem can be used to construct all deranging exponents for m. This time there are 
(A(m)/WW - 2/qlq E WI 
of them. The arguments above remain valid when W is void and, consequently, the products 
are equal to 1. This ends the proof. 
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A deranging exponent c in a number theoretic public key cryptosystem based on m cannot 
provide concealment of 100% of all possible messages which can be sent in that system, but it 
nevertheless provides as much concealment as possible. So we need a measure of the ability of 
a cryptosystem to conceal messages. 
Definition 4. Let a number theoretic public key cryptosystem have encoding modulus m and 
encoding exponent c. Let N be the number of residue classes modulo m whose members 
satisfy the congruence. 
xc =x mod (m). 
Then the opacity of the cryptosystem is 
1 - N/m, 
whether expressed as a real number or as a per cent. 
Theorem 2 showed that no number theoretic public key cryptosystem can have 100% 
opacity. Corollary 2 showed that no cryptosystem can have an opacity strictly between 0% and 
40%. In the RSA case the two prime factors of m exceed lOso, and a look at the proof of 
Corollary 2 shows that opacity must exceed 49.99999% if it is nonzero. 
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